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ABSTRACT. The very title of Bruce Ackerman's now three-volume masterwork, We the
People, signifies his commitment to popular sovereignty and, beyond that, to the embrace of
democratic inclusion as the leitmotif of American constitutionalism. But "popular sovereignty,"
not to mention "democracy," has many conceptions, and there is a tension within Ackerman's
overall project as to which of the varieties he is most comfortable with. The United States
Constitution, though written (and ratified) in the name of "We the People," nonetheless adopts
a theory of "representative democracy" that is purposely designed to minimize to the vanishing
point the ability of "the people" to have any direct role in making national-level political
decisions. They are restricted to electing purported representatives, who will make decisions in
their name, with or without genuine consultation. One can contrast this to American state
constitutions, almost all of which include at least some aspect of direct democracy and many of
which, with California being the most prominent example, allow vigorous popular participation
in governance through initiative and referendum. So an obvious question is whether Ackerman
simply feels constrained by the undoubted limits of the national Constitution - one lives with the
Constitution one has, not the Constitution one might wish to have -or, on the contrary, whether
he affirmatively embraces the particular crabbed form of popular sovereignty instantiated in the
United States Constitution and rejects the more robust forms that are available not only in
theory but also in the practices of many states (and foreign countries).
AUTHOR. W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. These
remarks were initially prepared for a symposium at the Yale Law School from February 28 to
March 1, 2014, on the occasion of the publication of Bruce Ackerman's We the People: The Civil
Rights Revolution. I am truly grateful for having been given the opportunity to participate in an
occasion honoring the work of someone whose ideas have been essential over the past quarter
century to my own thought about American constitutional development and to the editors of the
Yale Law journal for their helpful suggestions. And, as always, I am grateful to Jack Balkin and
Mark Graber for their responses to an earlier draft of this essay.
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INTRODUCTION: IMPLICATIONS OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
Central to Bruce Ackerman's remarkable examination of the
transformations in basic understandings of our constitutional project has been
his embrace of the mantra of popular sovereignty. Quite obviously, this is
captured in the overall title of his ambitious project, We the People. As with his
colleague Akhil Reed Amar,' these words almost literally sing out with the
image of an aroused public fully capable of the majestic dream of self-
government. Ackerman opens his essay on "Higher Lawmaking" speaking in a
self-described "[p]rophetic [v]oice," proclaiming that "[t]he People must
retake control of their government."2 The verb carries with it the unmistakable
suggestion that there is precedent for "taking control" that could be drawn on
for inspiration. He is not a utopian aspiring to go where no one has traveled
before, but, rather, a quasi-therapist attempting to remind us of what we were
capable of in the past and could return to today if only we freed ourselves of
our depressed sense of our own possibilities. To be sure, he has a complex
notion of how precisely "the People" have manifested their rule in the past-or
could do so in the future, about which I will have much more to say below. The
central challenge is to determine whether "popular sovereignty" is anything
more than a "glittering generality," useful, perhaps, as a trope in political
mobilization but otherwise of little, if any, utility as a genuine analytical
concept.'
There is nothing "innocent" about a commitment to popular sovereignty,
especially if one believes there is a connection between such "sovereignty" and
the actual exercise of decisionmaking within a polity. As Eric Nelson
emphasizes in a brilliant forthcoming book, The Royalist Revolution: Themes in
1. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (2oo5) ("With
simple words placed in the document's most prominent location, the Preamble laid the
foundation for all that followed.").
2. Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 63 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION].
3. I was greatly stimulated by Ben Tolman's Sovereignty and Power, written for a seminar that
Larry Lessig and I taught at the Harvard Law School during Fall 2013 on theoretical and
practical issues presented by the prospect of an Article V constitutional convention. He
argues that "while the rhetoric of popular sovereignty might be strong, it ultimately
amounts to a 'glittering generality' that possesses little practical strength on its own." Ben
Tolman, Sovereignty and Power 2 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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American Political Thought, 1766-1789,4 it does not violate the logic of "popular
sovereignty" for that sovereign to authorize some small group of individuals,
perhaps even a king, to make actual decisions in the name of the res publica.
The greatest of all theorists making just this point is Thomas Hobbes.s But for
most partisans of the term, such "sovereignty" is manifested in a more direct
linkage between the members of a given political order and the decisions made
in their name. This, of course, is the basis of all "democratic" political theory,
whether it takes the form of "direct" choice by the populace' or the
"representative democracy" most notably defended by James Madison.7
Ackerman has been insistent since the publication of the first volume in
what has now become his trilogy that he himself is a member of what might be
termed the "party of democracy" as against those he labels as "rights
fundamentalists" who would place ultimately fatal impediments in the way of
the demos.' This is especially telling in Ackerman's case because, as a gifted
political theorist, he had earlier demonstrated his philosophical commitment to
political liberalism and the inevitable limits that it must place on government."
And there can be no doubt that the heroes of his epic history of American
constitutional development are political leaders with capaciously liberal
understandings of the American constitutional project. But that is a contingent,
not a necessary, truth. There is a difference between the enterprise of political
theory and that of constitutional theory, and when engaging in the latter,
Ackerman privileges the self-determining possibilities of popular sovereignty,
in contrast to post-World War II European critics of national constitutional
projects who posit anodyne notions of "constitutional patriotism" that translate
basically into commitment to versions of Kant, Rawls, or Habermas.o Not for
them are the inevitably flawed projects of flesh-and-blood human beings. To
this extent he is truly the colleague of his fellow Yale .professor Jed
4. ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING,
1766-1789 (forthcoming 2014).
5. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 121, 155-65 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1996) (1651).
6. See, e.g., PAUL WOODRUFF, FIRST DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGE OF AN ANCIENT IDEA (2005)
(discussing and defending Athenian democracy).
7. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. lo (James Madison).
8. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 11 (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN,
FOUNDATIONS].
9. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
1o. See, e.g.. JAN-WERNER MULLER, CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM (2007).
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Rubenfeld" -and perhaps even of Justice Antonin Scalia-in taking seriously
the notion that the United States Constitution, as created by "We the People,"
is the instantiation of our particular (and particularistic) national project, warts
and all.
Thus in Ackerman's schema, there is no immanent constitutional barrier,
so to speak, to the promulgation of decidedly unattractive transformative
constitutional amendments, whatever their particular provenance. The easiest
case, of course, would involve the use of Article V itself, however much the
central thrust of his work is to suggest the near-irrelevance of Article V in
explaining American constitutional change. But consider the possibility that
Congress proposes - and three-quarters of the states ratify- a new amendment
announcing that "Christianity is established as the state religion of the
American people, and the public worship of other gods is hereby forbidden."
Ackerman writes that it would be his duty as a judge to "uphold it as a
fundamental part of the American Constitution."" There is nothing in
Ackerman's work that suggests a desire to import into American constitutional
theory notions of transcendent "constitutional identity" that can be found, for
example, in German or Indian constitutional theory.13 Ackerman would not
(and, with regard to the realities of American society and history, almost
certainly could not) argue that America's constitutional secularism is so deeply
rooted - so "essential" to American identity- that it would require a revolution,
rather than merely a constitutional amendment, to overcome it and adopt a
more sectarian identity.
Popular sovereignty, unlike rights fundamentalism, does not assure what I
have elsewhere called "happy endings" to constitutional conflicts.1 4 One may
hope for the best, but one must also recognize that any given sovereign can be
11. See Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971 (2004)
(emphasizing the U.S. Constitution as the collective project of the American people and not
a simple reflection of natural law or international human rights); see also Sanford Levinson,
Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J.
353 (2004) (same).
12. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 8, at 14.
13. See GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 18, 58-60 (2010) (discussing
German conceptions of the "unconstitutional constitution"); id. at 37, 49-58 (discussing
India); see also Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once
and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 2, at 163, 175-79 (noting
German limitations on constitutional change). But see ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note
8, at 320-21 (flirting with the idea of a fully entrenched Bill of Rights, so long as it gained
"deep and decisive popular support").
14. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 249 (2d ed. 2011).
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quite horrendous. Should the sovereign's command violate the judge's
individual conscience, the proper response is presumably resignation rather
than lying as to what the constitution tolerates; there may be legal regimes for
which no honorable person should accept judicial office,' 5 but if one does
accept office, it is dishonorable to reject the duty of fidelity even to unjust or
tyrannical law. Indeed, Ackerman's insistence on the particular
"transformations" of American legal reality that he has elaborated entails the
proposition that the ex ante (non-transformed) legal system was properly
interpreted to include rank injustice. That, after all, is what required
transformation (and even the blood sacrifice of 750,000 lives). To deny the
possibility of "constitutional evil," 6 which is fully "legitimate," at least legally
speaking, even if undoubtedly "evil," is to turn the narrative of American
constitutional development from a tragedy into a comedy, thereby trivializing
the reality of the American experience. It is the equivalent of allowing Cordelia
to live because otherwise King Lear is just too depressing.
So one obvious problem presented by popular sovereignty, though one
could equally say that it is presented by any theory of sovereignty, including
divine sovereignty, is the uncertain relationship between the claimed power to
make authoritative decisions-which are ultimately based on the "argument"
"because I say so" or, in the immortal words of Ring Lardner, "[s]hut up he
explained""- and substantive justice. To the extent that popular sovereignty is
15. Some people might have argued this was true of South Africa during the apartheid era or of
the antebellum United States and the necessity to recognize the rights of slaveholders. Or, it
might be argued, honorable people could sit on such courts and, by rejecting wooden forms
of positivism, ameliorate some of the worst aspects of the regimes. See, e.g., ROBERT COVER,
JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975) (analyzing the situation
of judges faced with slavery cases within the United States); DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD
CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: PATHOLOGIES OF LEGALITY (2010). Not at all
coincidentally, Dyzenhaus originally comes from South Africa, though he now teaches at the
University of Toronto and New York University.
16. See, e.g., MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 1-2
(20o6). To a significant degree, Ackerman has deferred a full analysis of "constitutional
interpretation" of the pre-transformed Constitution. It is not clear, for example, to what
extent he would agree with the jurisprudential approach set out by his late colleague in
COVER, supra note 15. It is telling that another prominent legal process philosopher, Ronald
Dworkin, also systematically evaded examining the extent to which even the most
Herculean American judge could avoid collaboration with slavery prior to the transformative
events of 1861-1865. See Sanford Levinson, Hercules, Abraham Lincoln, the United States
Constitution, and the Problem of Slavery, in RONALD DWORKIN 136 (Arthur Ripstein ed.,
2007).
17. RING W. LARDNER, JR., THE YOUNG IMMIGRUNTS 77 (1920).
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sometimes compared to divine sovereignty, we are reminded of medieval
debates about the extent to which God is unusually skilled, to the point of
perfection, in ascertaining the good, even if we poor humans truly living
behind a veil of ignorance cannot always discern the actuality of divine justice.
A more ominous possibility, however, is that God is the great Humpty
Dumpty, able to determine what counts as good (or evil) simply by virtue of
the power to say so. In the latter view, the fact that God commands something
is no evidence at all for the proposition that it fits any ascertainable notion of
justice or goodness. See, for example, the Book ofJob." So, after all, could it be
the case with the demos. Does an unjust (or even merely incompetent) popular
"sovereign" merit respect and obedience?
That being said, it is hard to read the Ackerman trilogy without believing
that we Americans especially should be inspired not only by the words "We the
People" but also by the majestic deeds of those who took them seriously by
refusing to accept an inadequate status quo as determinative of their own lives
and possibilities. Though it is always perilous to identify a certain point as the
"beginning," one can surely point to the revolutionary secessionism of the
American Revolution itself and its triumphant assertion of the basic right of
"the People" to re-establish their decidedly new forms of government rather
than accept whatever had been handed down to them by the English
constitutional and political traditions. Perhaps the most eloquent defense of
this version of American popular sovereignty is found in the great conclusion
of Federalist 14, written (under the name Publius, of course) by James Madison:
Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a
decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they
have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for
names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the
knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own
experience?'9
Ackerman's earlier work especially has gone almost out of its way to
emphasize elements of "illegality" by those engaging in the actuality of popular
sovereignty.o Though I am aware that he doesn't like the comparison, there is
is. See, e.g., Joan Acocella, Is There Justice in the Book of Job?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 16,
2013, http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2o13/12/16/131216crbo books-acocella
(reviewing MARK LARRIMORE, THE BOOK OF JOB: A BIOGRAPHY (2013)).
ig. THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison).
20. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE AcKER-MAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 12 (1998) [hereinafter
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an undoubtedly Schmittian strain in Ackerman, for it is always possible that the
sovereign people will determine that a given circumstance constitutes the state
of exception that justifies putting law in its place, so to speak, and returning to
whatever the sovereign might deem first principles." "It is," Carl Schmitt
wrote, "part of the directness of this people's will that it can be expressed
independently of every prescribed procedure and every prescribed process."2 2
To be sure, as Andreas Kalyvas notes, there are all-important differences
between Schmitt's full-scale antagonism to liberalism and Ackerman's own
liberal commitments, but these differences do not negate the existence of
similarities as well. And, as already noted, those liberal commitments, for the
constitutional theorist, take second place to an illiberal demos that can be said to
exercise its sovereignty.
Quite obviously, questions about popular sovereignty involve not only
abstract debates about the nature of sovereignty, but also assessments about
the capacity of the demos to make, more often than not, wise decisions. Why
would we assign sovereignty to any entity whose abilities in this respect we
doubt, unless we indeed define wisdom entirely by reference to the putative
sovereign? Among other things, though, this disqualifies us from ever saying
that the sovereign made a mistake, for the sovereign itself gets to define what
counts as wisdom or a mistake. 4 One must ask why anyone should even
respect popular judgments - let alone embrace "popular sovereignty" - if one is
not persuaded that such judgments are likely to be better, by some measurable
metric, than decisionmaking by the few or, for that matter, than flipping a coin
when faced with binary choices. A very important strain of contemporary
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] (noting the willingness of transformative movements,
beginning with the Founders in the 1780s, to manifest a "lack of respect [for] established
norms for revision"). For further discussion, see infra Part III.
21. On Schmitt, see CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 13 (George Schwab trans., 2005);
and, almost certainly more importantly, CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Jeffrey
Seitzer trans., 2008) [hereinafter SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY]. Andreas Kalyvas
elaborates this aspect of Ackerman's thought in his brilliant DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS
OF THE EXTRAORDINARY: MAX WEBER, CARL SCHMITT, AND HANNAH ARENDT (2008).
22. SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 21, at 131. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 40
(James Madison) for the Madisonian instantiation of a similar argument.
23. KALYVAS, supra note 21, at 167.
24. No one who has ever taken seriously the slogan "Question Authority" can be entirely
comfortable with any theory of sovereignty (save, perhaps for radical notions of "individual
sovereignty" which, if taken seriously, eventuate in rank-and unacceptable- anarchism).
For an expression of this latter view, see Randy Barnett's contribution to this symposium,
Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L.J. 2576 (2014).
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democratic theory addresses whether there are good "epistemic" grounds to
support democratic decisionmaking.2 s
So among the many questions raised by Ackerman's overall project is the
particular nature of his commitment to "popular sovereignty." The obvious
point is that "popular sovereignty," like most important notions in political
theory-or, for that matter, almost all of what is taught as "constitutional law"
in American law schools-is an "essentially contested concept,"26 capable, by
definition, of multiple, often conflicting, legitimate interpretations. 27 This
means that one may find out relatively little by discovering that everyone is
making use of a given concept, especially if that concept has a decidedly
positive valence in public discourse." The devil inevitably is in the details of
particular conceptions of what some may well feel are terminally vague
overarching concepts. What follows, then, is an attempt to limn some of the
details of Ackerman's very particular conception of "popular sovereignty." As
25. See DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK (2008)
(defending theories of "epistemic proceduralism"); HELENE LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC
REASON: POLITICS, COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE RULE OF THE MANY (2013) (same).
For critiques of such confidence, see JAMIE TERENCE KELLEY, FRAMING DEMOCRACY: A
BEHAVIORAL APPROACH To DEMOCRATIC THEORY 90-92 (2012); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY
AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013).
26. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 167 (1956).
27. Think, of course, of almost any aspect of what I have taken to calling the "Constitution of
Conversation." See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA'S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 19 (2012).
28. My favorite example of this point is DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 133 (1981), which
demonstrates that there are io8 logically defensible notions of the concept of "equality."
This helps to account, I believe, for the bitterness of debates surrounding, say, "affirmative
action," inasmuch as they feature committed proponents of two antagonistic, but tenable,
notions of equality who almost literally cannot comprehend why their adversaries do not
accept a given notion as the one true meaning. For an example of such bitterness at the level
of the United States Supreme Court, see the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Breyer in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007). The Chief Justice, for example, accuses Justice Breyer's dissent of "fail[ing] to
ground the result it would reach in law," id. at 735, suggesting, perhaps, that Justice Breyer
is either simply incompetent at understanding what "law" requires or is mendaciously
rejecting the duty of legal fidelity in favor of other commitments. Surely it is more likely that
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer have a good-faith disagreement about the
complicated and controversial meaning of "equal protection." See also Sanford Levinson,
Contribution to Has the Supreme Court Gone Too Far?: A Symposium, COMMENTARY, Oct. 2003,
http://commentarymagazine.com/article/has-the-supreme-court-gone-too-far (suggesting
that liberals and conservatives should recognize that Justices can have good-faith
disagreements without traducing their legal duties in favor of a rankly ideological vision).
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we shall see, Ackerman's principal interest is in decisionmaking by political
leaders (and, necessarily, elites) who make decisions in the name of the People
rather than in such decisionmaking by the People themselves (assuming, of
course, we know what that might mean). In this, he is a worthy descendant of
James Madison, who firmly rejected any notion of "direct democracy" in favor
of an exclusive reliance on "representative democracy."29
1. "POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY" AS "MAKE-BELIEVE"
Any discussion of "popular sovereignty" necessarily entails recognition of
the extent to which, like its cousin the "social contract," it might be termed a
"constitutive fiction" rather than anything whose existence can be
demonstrated to a disbelieving skeptic. A former colleague of Ackerman's at
Yale, the great colonial historian Edmund Morgan, in his book tellingly titled
Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America,
emphasized the thoroughly fictive nature of this "invented" 30 notion.
"Government," wrote Morgan, "requires make-believe."" It is the "fiction" of
popular sovereignty that in actuality "enable[s] the few to govern the many."32
An earlier generation didn't need that fiction; it was enough to proclaim that
authority was given by God, perhaps quoting Romans 13:1 in support.33 But
the "divine right of kings" and other magistrates did not survive the
seventeenth century. Instead, Hobbes and Locke emerged with brand new
theories of legitimate authority in which "the people," at least rhetorically,
played the crucial role. So for several centuries, at least in the West, the claim
to rule has required some linkage to vox populi. To be sure, there are all sorts of
ways of establishing (or claiming) such linkages, and, as suggested by
Morgan's mordant comment about the relationship between "the few" and
"the many," they do not necessarily require much, if anything, by way of active
involvement of the citizenry in the actual making of decisions. As Nelson
emphasizes, defenders of British kings-and critics of the idea of
"parliamentary sovereignty," including most American "patriots" up to the
29. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
30. Were he a post-modernist, perhaps he would have used the term "socially constructed."
31. EDMUND MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 13 (1988).
32. Id. at 14.
33. "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the
powers that be are ordained of God." Romans 13:1 (King James).
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moment of the American Revolution - acknowledged the monarchical claim
that they were "authorized" to rule unilaterally, including, importantly, the
exercise of "prerogative" powers, by the people themselves.34 Or, from a
different end of the political spectrum, one may be a Leninist claiming a
privilege to speak in the name of a "people" whose false consciousness may
deprive them of the present ability to recognize what is really in their own
interest -though they will gratefully accept the new dispensation at some later
time. At the other end may be a Quaker-like endless deliberation that comes to
an end only when genuine consensus -presumably manifesting a truly general
will-is reached. In between, of course, are a plethora of other possibilities,
united only by the felt belief, at least in the "modern" world, whatever its
various "disenchantments" 35 about the philosophical or theological foundations
of political life, that those wishing to exercise political power are well advised
to claim that they are in fact the vessels through which some kind of "popular
sovereignty" or democratic authority speaks.
In any event, one certainly cannot understand American history without
paying adequate attention to the discourse of popular sovereignty. Consider
the pronouncement in the Declaration of Independence that "the people"
possess a fundamental right "to alter or to abolish [any Form of Government],
and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness." 6 The Declaration, of course, also included
reference to a "long train of abuses" that no doubt helped to create the proper
sympathy for revolutionary violence in "the opinions of mankind" that were
the audience for the Declaration.37 The Revolution, of course, was succeeded by
what Ackerman himself emphasizes was the legally dicey casting aside of
America's first constitution, the Articles of Confederation. No one was arguing
that the Articles constituted a "[t]yrann[ical]" or even particularly "unjust"
political order; no "long train of abuses" could be laid at the door of the six-
year-old system of government established in 1781. Instead, it was deemed by
those who supported the new Constitution to be remarkably counter-
34. NELSON, supra note 4.
35. See Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SocIOLOGY 129, 155
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., 2d ed. 1991) ("The fate of our times is
characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the
'disenchantment of the world."').
36. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
37. Id. paras. 2-3.
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productive with regard to achieving the "Safety and Happiness" of the newly
independent Americans. That was more than enough to justify scrapping it,
which entailed, of course, simply ignoring the requirement that any
amendments receive the approval of each and every one of the thirteen existing
state legislatures.3' As Madison argued forthrightly in Federalist 40, an
adequate response to political "exigencies" may take precedence over "a rigid
adherence" to legal forms; such rigidity would in fact "render nominal and
nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the people to 'abolish or alter
their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness."'39
This is the "founding heritage" that is truly most important to Ackerman,
and not the particular forms established in Philadelphia or afterward. I share
his view. That does not, however, really allow us to identify the full meaning of
Ackerman's (or, for that matter, my) commitment to "popular sovereignty" or,
even more, "democracy." H&lne Landemore begins her important new book
Democratic Reason by writing that "[d]emocracy is generally hailed, in the West
at least, as the only legitimate form of government." 40 One rarely finds in the
contemporary United States the public rejection by would-be political leaders
of popular rule, even if relatively few of these "leaders" would unabashedly
define themselves as "populists." It is this latter point that gives bite to Richard
Parker's subtitling his own book Here, the People Rule a "Populist Manifesto."4'
Even more infrequent, one might suggest, is the presence of a full-throated
populist sensibility like Parker's on the campuses of elite universities (though,
of course, he himself teaches at the Harvard Law School). So it is worth asking
where along the spectrum of possibilities Ackerman should be placed. This
question takes on a special resonance with regard to the justification for
ignoring established legal rules.
11. ACKERMAN AND CREATIVE ILLEGALITY
Consider the difference between transformative movements that cast
themselves, on the one hand, as resisting ostensible oppression, and those, on
the other hand, that claim instead only that a higher horizon of Madisonian
38. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION Of 1781, art. XIII.
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 40 (James Madison).
40. LANDEMORE, supra note 25, at i (footnote omitted).
41. RICHARD PARKER, HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO
(1994).
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"safety and happiness" could be achieved with the requisite changes.
Transformation is easier to justify, certainly rhetorically and perhaps even
morally, if the status quo is linked with "abuses," whether they are evidenced
by overt oppression or the weakness of an existing framework of government
that makes effective governance impossible, as was alleged to be the case with
the Articles of Confederation. If proponents of the new Constitution were
entitled to ignore restraints imposed by Congress and the Articles because of
the "exigencies" of the circumstances facing the new American nation, all the
more was this the case regarding the second of Ackerman's "constitutional
moments." Reconstuction, of course, depended on first maintaining the Union
by force of arms between 1861 to 1865 and then attempting to achieve genuine
"regime change" in the defeated states that had attempted to secede and form a
new Confederate States of America. After all, we are necessarily confronting the
most elemental injustice in American constitutional history and a pre-
transformationist constitutional tyranny that could be overcome by the
inventive (and again only semi-legal, at best) creativity of a new group of de-
facto "founders" of a new regime. Such creativity can be found as well with
regard to the third great "moment," the New Deal, and this is surely true as
well of what now becomes perhaps the fourth great such "moment," the civil
rights revolution.
It is worth mentioning, though, that Ackerman mutes the theme of
"illegality," especially if that involves significant public disorder-as against the
decisions of political leaders to reject certain constitutional boundaries -as we
move closer to the present. With regard to the New Deal, there was always the
specter of FDR's refusing to obey a decision invaliding the suspension of the
Gold Clause, though perhaps some would mention as far more significant the
invention of the modern administrative state and its embrace of often full-
throated discretionary decisionmaking that left traditional notions of rule of
law in shambles.42 But, to put it mildly, there was nothing at all analogous to
the refusal by Congress in 1865 to seat representatives and senators who had
42. See WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EXCEPTION: THE FRANKFURT
SCHOOL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1994) (emphasizing the centrality to Weimar legal theory of
the development of the modern administrative state); see also Sanford Levinson & Jack M.
Balkin, Morton Horwitz Wrestles with the Rule of Law, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 483 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010). Surely one might
believe that the administrative state does indeed represent "delegation running riot,"
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring),
even if one also comes to the conclusion that there is no practical alternative with regard to
the complexities of the modern state and modern society. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2011).
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been elected by state governments whose legitimacy had been recognized by
the President of the United States (and who had, of course, notably been
counted as part of the numerator of states required to give legal vitality to the
Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery), let alone reinstating military
occupation of a number of would-be "states" and quite literal "reconstruction"
of their governments in an effort to achieve genuine what we today would call
"regime change." It is difficult to find in the latest volume in Ackerman's
monumental project, The Civil Rights Revolution, any mention of genuinely
creative illegality even if he praises the creativity of new conceptions of
administrative regulation that were engendered by the prohibition of
employment discrimination.4 3 The great episodes of civil disobedience -or, on
occasion, decidedly non-civil rioting-all occur offstage; Martin Luther King,
Jr., appears primarily as a co-equal political negotiator with President Lyndon
Johnson rather than a (and certainly not the) leader of a fractious movement
that often took to the streets in an ill-disguised effort to provoke violence on
the part of white segregationist officials that might generate a backlash of
sympathy for the Civil Rights Movement."4 And even the various pushes by
political leaders on the constitutional envelope seem milder than what FDR
generated, even if one readily grants the greatness of the Civil Rights
Movement and its constitutive importance.
III. ACKERMAN'S FAITH IN A FUNDAMENTALLY ANTI-DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION
The central dilemma, both for Ackerman and, practically speaking, the rest
of us, is that he has constructed his paean to (some form of) popular
sovereignty and political democracy on the foundations of a Constitution that
43. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 174-75 (2014)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS].
44. See, for example, CYNTHIA LEVINSON, WE'VE GOT A JOB: THE 1963 BIRMINGHAM CHILDREN'S
MARCH (2012), on the provocative use of children as marchers, about which King (and
others) was profoundly ambivalent. Id. at 66-70. As it happened, the March was a stunning
success, inasmuch as Birmingham police commissioner Eugene "Bull" Connor turned the
firchoses on the children and confined somewhere between three and four thousand
children, including a nine-year-old, Audrey Fay Hendricks, who spent a week in jail. Id. at
81-89. Fortunately, none of these children lost their lives, though that could not necessarily
have been predicted in advance. But it was their willingness quite literally to put their lives
on the line that led to John F. Kennedy's belated endorsement of the Civil Rights Movement
in May 1963 and the introduction of what became, under his successor Lyndon Johnson, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 56, 348 n.25.
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could not, in its own way, be more antagonistic to the enactment of such
sovereignty by the mass of living and breathing citizens. Yes, the Preamble
speaks in the name of "We the People," and that is no small matter, at least
ideologically. But one must put that within the context that James Madison
and his friends in Philadelphia had little or no regard for popular judgment.
They might well have endorsed government of the people, by rejecting the
possibility of aristocracy in the Titles of Nobility Clauses,45 and, even more
certainly, for the people, inasmuch as Madison at least was obsessed with
overcoming the problem of "faction" and its privileging of mere partiality and
selfishness over the genuine good of the "the people."46 But no one should
confuse government of or for the people with government by the people.
Consider in this context a 1777 statement in The Pennsylvania Journal: "It has
been said often, and I wish the saying was engraved over the doors of every
State House on the continent, that 'all power is derived from the people,' but it
has never yet been said that all power is seated in the people."47
Regard for popular judgment was certainly not an attribute of most of
those who drafted our Constitution. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
forthrightly told his fellow delegates in Philadelphia that "[t]he evils we
experience flow from the excess of democracy."4' Although the mass of the
people do not necessarily lack civic virtue, he continued, they are, alas, prone to
becoming "the dupes of pretended patriots," such as those who initiated Shays'
Rebellion in Gerry's home state.4 9 One will look in vain through Hamilton's or
Madison's speeches or contributions to The Federalist for any belief in the
genuine merits of popular judgment. In his remarkable speech of June 18, 1787,
which basically endorsed a modified British system of government, including a
presidential monarch, Hamilton first referred to "the amazing violence &
turbulence of the democratic spirit"s0 and went on to note that "evils operating
in the States . . . must soon cure the people of their fondness for
democracies."" Indeed, he appeared to take great pleasure in observing that
"[t]he members most tenacious of republicanism . . . were as loud as any in
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-o.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 1o (James Madison).
47. NELSON, supra note 4 (quoting PA. J., June 4, 1777).
48. 1 THE RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 48 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 289.
51. Id. at 291.
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declaiming agst. the vices of democracy."52 In case we have not sufficiently
gotten the point, after noting that "[t] he voice of the people has been said to be
the voice of God," he dismissed it as "not true in fact. The people are turbulent
and changing; they seldom judge or determine right." No one could reasonably
believe that "a democratic assembly" genuinely attentive to the views of "the
mass of the people" could "be supposed steadily to pursue the public good.""
Hamilton can be said to be criticizing the epistemic merits of democracy.5 4 It is
impossible to imagine Hamilton responding to some argument about the
merits and demerits of some public policy by suggesting, "let's let the people
decide, because they are more likely than not to get it right." The vox populi is
far more likely to be the vox asini than anything resembling the vox Dei (unless,
of course, one has adopted a thoroughly nominalist view of Divine Sovereignty
that exempts God from any duty to be either "rational" or "good").
Gordon Wood describes the Madison who arrived in Philadelphia as
thoroughly disillusioned with democracy, not least because of his service in the
Virginia House of Delegates between 1784 and 1787. He had, says Wood,
"found out what democracy in America might mean,"5 s and the news was not
good. "The Virginia legislators seemed so parochial, so illiberal, so small-
minded, and most of them seemed" not at all motivated by the aspiration to
discover and then achieve the "public interest."s6
Federalist 1o is in fact a ringing attack on the merits of local government
because of the near certainty of capture by self-interested "factions" inimical to
the public good. In that paper, Madison writes, "democracies have ever been
spectacles of turbulence and contentions, have ever been found incompatible
with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as
short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths."5 7 To be sure, he
was referring to what we today call "direct democracy," in contradistinction to
the "representative democracy" he would go on to defend, but the mistrust of
unmediated popular judgment by "We the People" is loud and clear. Madison
expressed greater confidence in the filtered judgment that could be provided by
a national Congress. One wonders what he might think about former Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates's recent expression of thoroughgoing contempt for
52. Id. at 288.
53. Id. at 299.
54. See supra note 25.
55. LEVINSON, supra note 27, at 78.
56. Id.
5. THE FEDERALIST No. so (James Madison).
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the United States Congress: "I saw most of Congress as uncivil, incompetent at
fulfilling their basic constitutional responsibilities (such as timely
appropriations), micromanagerial, parochial, hypocritical, egotistical, thin-
skinned and prone to put self (and re-election) before country."" Why should
anyone have much regard for popular decisionmaking, even if ostensibly
refined by the procedures of representative democracy?
In any event, as Morton Horwitz has written, "[d]emocracy was
consistently a negative term for most of the Framers' generation," 9 especially if
we modify this sentence to refer to the assumptions of the Framers themselves
and not, for example, to those Americans, distinctly unrepresented in
Philadelphia, who might have had more faith in popular judgment. Recall that
Jefferson, almost certainly the most "democratic" of our Founders -at least if
we bracket out the devastating embarrassment that he was a substantial
slaveowner- suggested in his first Inaugural Address that "We are all
Republicans, we are all Federalists," not that "we are all 'democrats."'"o
So consider the crucial import of another key sentence in The Federalist, this
one from Federalist 63, written by Madison. It was part of his defense of
representative democracy, which he saw as the great intellectual breakthrough of
the Constitution. Thus he emphasized- indeed italicized-that part of the
genius of the new system is its "total exclusion of the people, in their collective
capacity."6' "We the People" would never, ever, be invited to make decisions as
a sovereign entity. Each and every decision, from the most mundane statute or
resolution to potentially transformative constitutional amendments, would be
made by the representatives of the people. The formal political freedom of the
American people would be expressed exclusively in elections for these
representatives. True, they could petition their governors for redress of
grievances or even engage in mass political movements,6' but, at the end of the
day, every petition and every mass rally might be for naught if a sufficient
number of representatives - including the President, of course - remained
obdurate. We have a government with multiple formal veto points, beginning
with formal bicameralism and a presidential veto that with some frequency
58. ROBERT M. GATES, DuTY: MEMOIRS OF A SECRETARY AT WAR 581 (2014).
59. Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of Change:
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30,58 (1993).
6o. Thomas Jefferson, Inauguration Address (Mar. 4, 18o), reprinted in 8 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 1 (H.A. Washington ed., Washington, Taylor & Maury 1854).
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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turns us into a tricameral system, purposely designed to make legislation
difficult.
It is useful to compare the United States Constitution with many American
state constitutions, which offer potential "workarounds" of institutional stasis
and the significant bias toward the status quo that is built into any anti-
majoritarian political system.3 Many American states allow popular initiatives
and referenda that permit the people -or at least those claiming the ability to
speak for them- to take matters into their own hands by means such as
holding new constitutional conventions and supplanting existing constitutions
when it is thought necessary and proper to do S0.64 Christian Fritz's truly
remarkable book, American Sovereigns: The People and America's Constitutional
Tradition Before the Civil Warjs demonstrates that many Americans, at least
when crafting their state institutions, took fully seriously the proclamation in
the Declaration of Independence of "the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish" their existing frameworks of government. 6 Indeed, it was none other
than James Madison, while defending some of the legal irregularities of the
Philadelphia Convention in Federalist 40, who wrote that "in all great changes
of established governments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid
adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and nugatory"
the great principle of popular sovereignty that Madison at least on occasion
endorsed by virtue of supporting and citing the Declaration of Independence.6 7
To be sure, he went on, "since it is impossible for the people spontaneously
and universally to move in concert towards their object[,] . . . it is therefore
essential that such changes be instituted by some informal and unauthorized
propositions, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number of
citizens,"6 selected in some manner from the wider hoi polloi for whom
Madison had little regard.
63. See Adrian Vermeule, Social Choice in the Wild: Supermajorities and the Future of Democracy,
NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 3, 2014, at 52 (reviewing MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, COUNTING THE
MANY: THE ORIGINS AND LIMITS OF SUPERMAJORITY RULE (2014)).
64. See ANTHONY KING, THE FOUNDING FATHERS V. THE PEOPLE: PARADOXES OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 7-8 (2012) (expressing near disbelief that the national political system includes
none of the mechanisms for more robust direct democracy that can be found in most states).
65. CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 21-22 (2008).
66. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 40 (James Madison).
68. Id.
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That Madison himself hardly embraced the full implications of his
potentially incendiary arguments does not negate their importance, especially
inasmuch as many other Americans, even if not necessarily national political
elites, were indeed inspired by the models of popular sovereignty set for them
by at least some of their revolutionary ancestors-many of whom, of course,
were still alive. Perhaps most interesting in this respect was Thomas Wilson
Dorr, the Harvard-educated lawyer who inspired "Dorr's Rebellion," which
was actually the attempt to vindicate a new "People's Constitution" drafted by
a self-generated popular assembly and then supported by an overwhelming
number of Rhode Island voters. This new "People's Constitution" was meant
to replace the politically illegitimate royal Charter of 1663 that continued to
structure Rhode Island government (and to prevent most people from voting)
a full half-century following the adoption of the federal Constitution and its
purported guarantee to each state of a "Republican Form of Government.""*
IV. ACKERMAN'S CRITIQUE OF OUR CURRENT "CANON"
A powerful theme of The Civil Rights Revolution is the deficient nature of
the "canon" that we teach our students about the epic history of American
constitutional development and the need to broaden it well beyond the almost
entirely "juris-centric" focus on "great cases." To the extent that one purpose of
the "canon" is to produce a culturally literate caste of lawyer-leaders, 70 we in
the legal academy should be ashamed at the "juris-centrism" of our syllabi and
the concomitant ignorance of the great "framework statutes" that are of
fundamental importance for anyone seeking to understand our working
constitutional order.71 I could not agree more. But I would go on to condemn
as well the near-illiteracy about state constitutional development that our
present curriculum tends to produce. It is a true shame that most lawyers know
nothing about the epic Rhode Island struggles of the 1840s, save perhaps for
the unwillingness of the Supreme Court, in Luther v. Borden, to weigh in on the
matter and its proclamation instead of the nonjusticiability of claims brought
69. The story is wonderfully told in ERIK J. CHAPUT, THE PEOPLE'S MARTYR: THOMAS WILSON
DORRAND His 1842 RHODE ISLAND REBELLION (2013).
70. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 11i HARV. L. REv. 963
(1998).
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under the Republican Form of Government Clause.72 Among other
consequences of this decision is that law students are never encouraged to
engage in any significant discussion about what actually constitutes a
"Republican Form of Government." The clause is almost as irrelevant as the
clause authorizing Congress to issue letters of marque and reprisal. This may
go beyond being a shame and be more aptly described as a disgrace.
The entirety of Part One of The Civil Rights Revolution is titled "Defining
the Canon," and one of Ackerman's principal aims is to encourage those of us
who teach constitutional law -and, one might add, especially those of us who
embark on the creation of constitutional law casebooks - to escape the
strictures of our present imagination and incorporate, for example, the
fundamentally important "landmark statutes" that are the focus of his book.7
"Will the legal profession grant," he asks, "the landmark statutes a central place
in the constitutional canon for the twenty-first century?"74 Or will we continue
to insist that "the Constitution" is found only in the text of an eighteenth
century document, as formally amended, plus judicial decisions purporting to
"interpret" that document? It should be clear that the importance of expanding
the canon, for Ackerman, is not only to enable us better to understand the
actualities of our constitutional order, but also to inspire us and future
generations to emulate those who came before by engaging in similar
ameliorative actions. But, we might ask, what examples of popular sovereignty
should be "canonized" and, in turn, what precisely are they inspiring us to do
in our own times?
V. ACKERMAN'S EMPHASIS ON "DUALIST DEMOCRACY"
Ackerman's most famous theoretical notion involves "dualist democracy,"
which is explicitly contrasted with what he regards as an inferior "monistic"
version of democracy. 75 Both envision aroused publics, but for Ackerman the
crucial difference is that "dualist democracy" requires channeling such arousals
into an extraordinarily complex, even byzantine, political process. This process,
just as importantly, eventuates in the actual decisions being made by elected
political leaders -for Ackerman they are often Presidents - capable of breaking
72. 48 U.S. 1, 42-47 (1849).
73. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 12.
74. Id. at 81.
7S. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 8, at 3-33.
2663
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the congealed forms of the existing political order and bringing about a more
acceptable transformed one.76 No doubt some committed legal formalists may
be frightened even by Ackerman's disdain for "strained legalisms" 77 or
"legalistic discussions of prior case law,"75 let alone his justifications of the
presumptively illegal dimensions of earlier "constitutional moments.""' But if
one compares Ackerman, say, to Thomas Wilson Dorr or to some of the other
thinkers and actors delineated in Fritz's work, it is difficult indeed to see much
"radicalism" - or even "populism" -in his theory. How could it be, after all,
when he announces that his principal aim is to "reinvigorate the Founding
tradition of popular sovereignty,"so given the remarkably desiccated
understanding of that concept held by the most prominent Founders?
And, tellingly, for all of the invocations of "We the People," The Civil Rights
Revolution underscores the extent to which Ackerman's historical project,
remarkably illuminating as it is, focuses on elite leaders and not really on the
great unwashed who might have constituted the political base for at least some
of these leaders. Ackerman's chief interest is in those "episodes" in American
history "in which America's greatest political leaders managed to renew the
country's constitutional tradition of popular sovereignty."" The "popular
sovereigns" may be like a Greek chorus or Shakespearean groundlings, but the
focus is on the actions of the kings and their courts.
The Civil Rights Revolution, therefore, is a truly stunning study of several
such political leaders, including two Presidents -Lyndon B. Johnson and, to
the undoubted surprise of many politically liberal readers, Richard M. Nixon -
and senators like Minnesota Democrat Hubert H. Humphrey and Illinois
Republican Everett McKinley Dirksen. There is one unelected political leader,
Martin Luther King, Jr., but, otherwise, what many of us over sixty remember
as "the Civil Rights Movement" is very much at the margins of the narrative.
The reader is led to believe that there were political giants in those days who
truly rose to the heightened demands of citizenship during times of
transformation. Part of the strength of the book is its copious quotations from
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 122-23 (discussing Everett Dirksen's
great speech justifying cloture with regard to the filibuster over the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
78. Id. at 134.
79. See supra text accompanying note 20.
8o. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 61 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
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the speeches of these central figures. Everett Dirksen's speech on the occasion
of his voting to end the seventy-seven-day filibuster by Southern Democrats of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 will for most readers, I suspect, be a revelation, a
truly great speech and meditation on what it means to take one's oath to the
Constitution with consummate seriousness." It alone vindicates Ackerman's
argument about the patent inadequacy of a "canon" that privileges, say,
Katzenbach v. McClung, the stunningly ineloquent (albeit unanimous) opinion
upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act, over Dirksen's speech.
Ackerman writes that his "task is to interpret the American Constitution as
it is, not as it ought to be."" To paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, we carry on
constitutional politics in this country with the Constitution we have, not the
Constitution we (or at least some of us) wish we had. That form of politics,
Ackerman believes, is an extraordinarily complex pageant of interconnected
"signals" that something may be going amiss in the political system. This
pageant includes various elections staggered over several cycles that will
generate the kinds of responsive and imaginative leaders capable of engaging in
the de facto constitutional amendment necessary to preserve the overarching,
albeit now changed, political order.
To be sure, many readers will no doubt disagree with Ackerman's
ostensibly positivist "as it is" description of the contemporary Constitution. He
asserts, for example, that the patent "inadequacy" of "state-centered" forms of
constitutional amendment inscribed in Article V has created such a "serious
problem" with regard to "redefin[ing our] fundamental commitments" that
We the People have accepted a substitute form of constitutional amendment
through the passage of the "landmark statutes" that are the focus of The Civil
Rights Revolution.4 The central message of this new book is the importance of
recognizing "the coordinate model of constitutional revision in which the
President, Congress, and the Court collaborate with landmark statutes and
superprecedents" that "serves as a legitimate substitute for formal Article V
amendments under modern conditions." 5
82. The text of the speech, given well before the days of C-SPAN, is available at Everett M.
Dirksen, Speech to Senate on the Civil Rights Bill, AM. RHETORIC: ONLINE SPEECH BANK,
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/everettmdirksencivilrightsbillspeech.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2014).
83. AcKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 71.
84. Id. at 32.
8s. Id. at 120.
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There is something at once splendid and perplexing about the Ackermanian
scheme of epicycles that constitute constitutional amendment outside the
formal constraints of Article V. Recognizing the patent defects of the 1787
constitutional document, Ackerman has devoted what is now the bulk of his
career to demonstrating that it is in fact not a fatal bar to constitutional
rectification. Remarkable things have happened, but, to say the least, one can
doubt that there is a consensus, either professional or lay, around the
proposition that there are indeed "legitimate substitute[s] for formal Article V
amendments under modern conditions." For better or, I would say, for worse,
I doubt that this understanding is part of many courses on American
constitutionalism, even, perhaps, at the Yale Law School. Everyone within the
community of academic constitutional theory is, of course, aware of the
Ackermanian argument, but that is very different from proclaiming that it has
carried the day. One must add, as well, the point that Ackerman must not only
persuade skeptics that these changes constitute genuinely amendatory
moments-rather than, for example, simple doctrinal extensions of what is
already present in our Constitution waiting only to be discovered and
elaborated by sufficiently talented lawyers." He must also convince doubtful
interlocutors that these moments comprise genuine instances of "popular
sovereignty" as distinguished, say, from elite-driven changes that are accepted,
perhaps with resignation, by the population in general who scarcely play any
generative role and may well feel alienated from the political system established
by the Constitution. It may be that forcing someone ostensibly committed to
"popular sovereignty" to work within the limits of the United States
Constitution, even as imaginatively reconceived by Ackerman, is a bit like
writing a novel without using the letter "e"17 or, perhaps, playing a Beethoven
sonata only on "period instruments" regardless of what we regard today as
their patent deficiencies." Both can be done, and the experiments no doubt
have a certain interest, but why would one want to adopt these limits as a way
of life?
Ackerman is well aware that there are competing models of "popular
sovereignty" in the American constitutional mosaic, particularly if one looks at
86. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2012).
87. See GEORGES PEREC, LA DISPARITION (1969) (written without using the letter "e," the most
common letter in French).
88. See Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L.
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American states. He contrasts the presence of "direct democracy" in many
American states with the exclusive reliance on "representative democracy" at
the national level. "Under the direct system, mandates are tested through a
specially structured referendum procedure that gives voters the final say."'
There are certainly those who believe that this is a "better" (or at least richer)
conception of "popular sovereignty" than one in which voters are deprived of
any real say save their ability to vote for candidates in elections that will
inevitably involve a plethora of competing issues.9 0 Ackerman aptly describes
our elections as "bundl[ed]" inasmuch as many voters will be forced to accept a
decidedly mixed package of issue positions on the part of those for whom they
cast their ballots. 9' Claims of "mandates" are often tendentious and patently
self-serving given that many voters will have voted for a particular candidate in
spite of rather than because of his or her position on a given issue. Ackerman not
only stresses the positivist point about the particular structure of the national
Constitution under which we operate, but also appears quite strongly to prefer
its procedures over those that actually empower the mass public. But why?
The key paragraph in Ackerman's argument is as follows:
Neither [direct nor representative democracy] is perfect-but that's life.
While both can be greatly improved, my task is to interpret the
American Constitution as it is, not as it ought to be. From this
perspective, the bundling objection [to multi-issue elections] is simply
inapt: it falsely supposes that our Constitution seeks to test claims of a
mandate by isolating single issues for focused decision by the voters.
Instead, our national tradition of popular sovereignty tests claims of a
mandate in a different way-by engaging the voters and their
representatives in a series of elections, and awarding a mandate to
constitutional movements that survive a rigorous institutional obstacle
course that gives their opponents repeated opportunities to defeat their
89. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 71.
go. See, for example, the debates on initiatives and referenda at state constitutional conventions
summarized in JOHN DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 84-91
(2009). And, lest one think this is simply an aberrational view shared by American
populists, see DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESS IN EUROPE (Bruno Kaufmann & M. Dane Waters
eds., 2004); and REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT
DEMOCRACY (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978) [hereinafter REFERENDUMS
AROUND THE WORLD].
91. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 71.
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initiatives at the polls. The point of my six-stage analysis is to describe
that obstacle course ....
But Ackerman seems to be doing more than simply "describ[ing]" an
"obstacle course." He appears affirmatively to embrace it and see it as better
than the more monistic brand of constitutional reform available in many
American states and other nations around the world. Because "it is usually too
easy to get initiatives on the ballot," "voters are regularly confronted with long
lists of unfamiliar proposals and cast their ballots on the basis of hurried
reactions to a media blitz."93 These do not constitute genuinely deliberative
moments by a Publian electorate, but instead are "charades" that "generate
well-founded skepticism about cheap appeals to popular sovereignty."94 Even
if elected representatives have their own "deficiencies," they are nonetheless
"often more knowledgeable than normal voters about the selfish motives that
lurk behind attractive slogans; and they have many political incentives to
safeguard the public against excessive factional depredation- incentives that
are lacking when the general electorate is invited to make a single up-or-down
vote on a complex issue."91
92. Id.
93. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 20, at 410.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 410-11. He repeats his aversion to direct democracy in his response to this symposium.
What is telling, I believe, is his tendency to identify direct democracy with "California
realities." Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling Constitutional Law, 123 YALE L. J. 3104, 3115 (2014).
This tendency to conflate all notions of direct democracy with the particularities of
California is, I have found, extremely common whenever one brings up the possible benefits
of alternatives to the cramped procedures of the United States Constitution. Obviously, no
system is perfect (including, most certainly, that created by the framers of that
Constitution), and we are always faced with the choice of accentuating either the positive or
working to eliminate the negative features of any given system. As contemporary
psychologists would predict, the actualities of such choices are often based on idiosyncratic
factors far more than a systematic (and dispassionate) survey of the full set of strengths and
weaknesses associated with any given possibility. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING,
FAST AND SLOW (2011). Even if one concedes that the California experience may present
some reasons for caution, one should recognize as well that referenda are used throughout
the world, and there is a substantial literature about their strengths and weaknesses. See,
e.g., REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 90. And, of course, they are used in
many other American states besides California. In his recent critique, The Founding Fathers v.
the People: Paradoxes of American Democracy, Anthony King, an English political scientist,
expresses surprise at the lack of any direct democracy at the national level of American
government even as it is a frequent part of state procedures. See KING, supra note 64, at 7-8,
119-21. Even, then, if there are important things to learn from the "realities" of the California
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Ackerman's description of the United States Constitution as instantiating
"our national tradition of popular sovereignty"'6 obviously begs the question.
As John Dinan argues in his important book The American State Constitutional
Tradition, the evidence provided by repeated instances of constitutional
creativity in the states is at least as telling, with regard to our "national
tradition of popular sovereignty," as is the singular set of decisions made in
1787 by framers decidedly skeptical of the actual competence of "We the
People."9 7 One may well believe that the 1787 Constitution was drafted at
almost the last possible historical moment in the United States when such a
patently undemocratic document would have been capable of achieving even
the particular form of popular ratification represented by the state conventions
mandated by Article VII. In any event, anyone interested in "American
constitutionalism" defined more broadly than a single-minded focus on only
one of the fifty-one current constitutions within the United States9' must
explain why the model of "popular sovereignty" provided by the National
Constitution is better than competing models found all across the country. It
cannot be dispositive that, say, the use of the initiative and referendum has
produced objectionable outcomes in California any more, presumably, than the
existence of objectionable outcomes without more delegitimizes all
decisionmaking by the President or Congress. There are, of course, no perfect
procedures, and one ultimately must engage in an analysis of the frequency
distribution of both positive and negative results in any given procedural
regime.
Ackerman quite obviously is no fan of Article V inasmuch as his project is
in effect to render it near irrelevant in favor of the complex process of non-
Article V "amendment." ie has also offered at least one formal reformation of
our current process of adopting constitutional amendments. Interestingly
enough, it adopts ratification by referendum, though the ability to propose an
amendment is restricted to a second-term President; in addition, the proposals
must apparently be accepted by a two-thirds vote of Congress." At that point,
experience, there are other, perhaps equally (or even more) important realities that can be
discerned in, say, Oregon, Washington, Ohio, or Maine, to mention only four American
states, let alone Switzerland or New Zealand.
96. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 71.
97. DINAN, supra note go.
98. Indeed, the number goes up to fifty-two if one includes Puerto Rico.
99. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 20, at 410-11. This is not altogether clear, as
Ackerman refers only to "approv[al] by Congress," which could also mean that only a
majority of each House (assuming no filibuster) would be required.
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they would be submitted to double national referenda, one occurring at each of
the "next two Presidential elections," and any proposals "should be added to
the Constitution if they gain popular approval." 00 In any event, such proposals
would escape having to run the gauntlet of gaining the approval of at least 75
legislative houses in 38 states."o' I regard this latter feature as an undeniable
good. I share Ackerman's general abhorrence of an amendment process that
excessively privileges the power of states to prevent necessary (or even
"merely" highly desirable) changes in our political system. That shared
abhorrence is not enough, however, to make me an enthusiastic proponent of
Ackerman's proposal.
So what is wrong with the proposal, beyond the unlikelihood of its actual
acceptance inasmuch as its initial adoption would itself require a constitutional
amendment that would presumably require running the almost-certainly fatal
gauntlet of veto by at least thirteen state legislatures unwilling to acknowledge
their irrelevance even in these particular circumstances? The answer, frankly, is
that such a procedure, dependent as it is on the approval of both President and
Congress, is almost completely unlikely ever to address any of the deep
structural problems inflicted on the United States by our adherence to the
surprisingly unamended 1787 Constitution. No President, for example, is likely
to initiate a proposal that he or she be subject to removal by a two-thirds vote
of no-confidence of both Houses of Congress meeting collectively."0 2 This is
true even if one takes into account the fact that, because of the mechanics of
Ackerman's proposal, the incumbent President would be long gone from the
Oval Office by the time such an amendment took effect. The reason is simple:
All Presidents, it appears, become devoted, as Madison certainly predicted, 0
to strengthening (or, at least, not diminishing) the powers of the Chief
Executive. It would be quite remarkable if any President self-consciously
wished to leave to a successor the inevitably diminished power that a
mechanism for displacement by a vote of no-confidence would represent. A
similar analysis would operate with regard, say, to weakening the President's
ioo. Id. at 410.
ioi. This assumes that Nebraska would be one of the states; otherwise ratification requires the
approval of seventy-six houses in thirty-eight states.
102. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 119-21 (2006) (defending
adoption of such a "no-confidence" procedure).
103. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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perhaps excessive veto power, given the immense difficulty of gaining the
requisite two-thirds vote in each branch of Congress to override vetoes.104
Nor is it likely that Congress would approve a constitutional amendment,
however desirable, requiring some form of proportional representation in the
House of Representatives instead of the present exclusive reliance on single-
member geographically based districts."os Perhaps both President and Congress
would agree that life tenure of Supreme Court justices is an outmoded concept,
which is surely the case, but that is scarcely the major structural deficiency
posed by the Constitution with regard to the ability of the national government
effectively to confront the challenges facing us. Moreover, the at least four- or
(more likely) five- or six-year delay between proposal and ratification -given
the necessity of two referenda concurrent with presidential elections - requires
that the presidential proposals not be predicated on the notion that some
pressing national problem demands a reasonably rapid solution (that cannot be
achieved, for whatever reason, through ordinary legislation or the standard
Article V procedure).
Direct democracy arose in the Western United States at the turn of the
twentieth century not simply because of an abstract commitment to a particular
notion of "democracy," but also, and almost certainly more importantly,
because of a well-justified disillusionment with the actual workings of
representative democracy. Hiram Johnson and his Progressive Era colleagues
did not "replace" representative democracy with direct democracy. Rather, they
supplemented the former with the latter, as a way both of holding
representatives accountable and of providing a way by which new ideas could
blast through a potentially congealed representative system.1o 6 As suggested
earlier, though, any given example of "popular sovereignty" must be tested not
only against some abstract notions of "democracy" or "government by the
people," but also with regard to actual measurable results. All systems have
their dangers; all systems have their attractions, and the challenge is to try to
figure out with some precision the actual costs and benefits of any given blend
of elite and popular governance. We should recognize that if we conclude that
104. See LEVINSON, supra note 102, at 38-49 (demonstrating the overwhelming tendency of
Presidents to prevail in veto battles).
ios. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, To End Government Shutdowns, End Partisan Gerrymandering,
AL JAZEERA AMERICA, Oct. 13, 2013, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2o3/10/13
/government-shutdowngerrymanderingdistricts.html.
106. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 27, at 123 (citing Stephen Griffin, California Constitutionalism,
Trust in Government and Direct Democracy (Tulane Univ. Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, No. o8-04, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114115).
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the costs of robust government "by the people" are likely to outweigh any
benefits, whether the root cause is popular ignorance 0 7 or mendacity, then this
must necessarily call into question why any serious person would adopt
popular sovereignty as a regulative ideal.
VI. BRUCE ACKERMAN AS A MODEL PUBLIAN
No one reading The Civil Rights Revolution can miss the mixture of careful
historical reconstruction and sheer admiration for those who engaged in that
revolution -whatever one might actually mean by that term-and thereby
made the United States a far better country. And no one can miss as well the
theme that it ought not be the last such transformation, for the work of moving
toward a country that truly achieves the magnificent vision set out in the
Preamble to the Constitution is never done. Part of that work, to be sure, is
giving full meaning to what has been accomplished by our political forbears;
but it is equally important that we view ourselves capable of moving beyond
them by engaging in our own work of transformation and amendment. The
journey toward what my friend and colleague Jack Balkin has called
"constitutional redemption"o is never-ending, always a work in progress and
sometimes, of course, faced with the prospects of significant regression and
not-so-attractive transformation.
Yes, we must give "due recognition to each generation's achievements in
shaping and reshaping the country's constitutional commitments over the
course of the centuries,"109 but that is only so that we the living (and future
generations) can emulate our forbears by engaging in "shaping and reshaping"
of our own-even if, as is undoubtedly the case, they might be quite shocked
by some of these developments. Ackerman ends his book with the invidious
use of the words "ancestor worship" as the evil to be avoided.' We must move
beyond those dangerous proclivities in American popular and legal culture
except insofar as our ancestors provide us models as idol-breakers (like
Abraham in Ur), even revolutionaries. We must realize that at least some of the
idols we must smash were created by our venerable ancestors. Our task is to
learn from their example, while not feeling mired in any particular solutions
107. See, e.g., SOMIN, supra note 25.
io8. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD
(2011).
log. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 337.
io. Id. at 340.
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that they believed were in fact adequate at a particular time. Their own
willingness to embrace often decidedly irregular processes trumps any deeply
embedded commitment to fidelity to their inevitably time-bound, incomplete,
and perhaps distorted substantive commitments. Again, one can only hope that
this "creativity" is in the service of admirable ends."'
Ackerman can easily be compared to Publius not only in his ambivalence
about the duty always to remain faithful to established forms, but also because
his entire life as a political theorist, law professor, and commentator on public
affairs has been devoted to pursuit of the public good. He fully instantiates the
spirit of what remain my two favorite paragraphs in The Federalist. The first is
quite literally from the first paragraph of the first of the 85 essays published
under the name Publius, though this one was in fact written by Alexander
Hamilton.
[I]t seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their
conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever
destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and
force."
Do we privilege and make normative whatever exists -the consequences of
"accident and force" -or do we instead engage in the Enlightenment virtue of
"reflection" in order ultimately to choose for ourselves how we wish to be
governed? After all, the Declaration of Independence speaks of the cardinal
political norm of "consent of the governed," and Publius suggests in effect that
the American people collectively are capable of giving genuine, and not merely
manufactured, consent. Ackerman's overall project makes relatively little sense
unless he believes that Publius is describing what will become an ongoing
project of the American people through time and not merely a one-time
episode of "reflection and choice" that is followed by an almost mindless
"veneration" for the choices made at historical time T.
The second passage is the concluding paragraph of Federalist 14 that I
quoted earlier, though I now add the last line: The People of America, acting
through "the leaders of the Revolution," "formed the design of a great
Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and
im. See supra Part I.
112. THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
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perpetuate."1 1 3 To perpetuate our "great Confederacy," which, of course, was
substantially overthrown by the Constitution itself, requires a willingness to be
open to suggestions of how existing institutions and legal norms established in
the wake of that Constitution, however transformational it was for its time,
need to be "improve[d]," even if that requires what many would see as radical
transformation.
The point is not that one must necessarily agree with Ackerman in each and
every one of his suggestions for improvement, let alone the entirety of his
remarkable schema of American constitutional development. Rather, it is that
one must recognize in Ackerman the instantiation of the Publian patriot,
consumed by a relentless devotion to achieving the public good. One need
never analyze an Ackermanian argument by asking cynically what "real"
agendas underlie his surface proclamations. In this he differs radically from
Publius himself, given the fact that Hamilton and Madison were crafting their
arguments to win over wavering skeptics about the new constitutional project
and, almost certainly, said many things they did not believe. Ackerman, like all
humans, may make his share of errors and mistakes, but they are truly
"honest" errors, not the product of a desire to manipulate gullible readers. He
has aspired to (and achieved) no higher public office than "good citizen." But
in a Republican Form of Government, what higher office is there?
113. THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (Alexander Hamilton).
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